The Stupidest Thing I've Heard All Day, April 9

From this morning's Mets-Phillies game (a tilt on which I'm sure Justin has no small amount of things to say):

(Note: This is in regard to a Paul LoDuca groundout the inning before that moved a runner to third who eventually scored. This conversation takes place the next time Paul LoDuca is up to bat. This conversation is not verbatim, but it's pretty damn close. I don't know who these assholes are.)

Asshole in the Booth No. 1: "Stat-heads will say that's a bad play, but it's not a bad play! It ended up scoring a run! That's good!"
Asshole in the Booth No. 2: "They ("stat-heads") can go into their laboratory with all their stats, for all I care."
No. 1: "Well ... stats are useful for some things (emphasis his)."
No. 2: "Yeah ... they are. But you should also actually watch the game (emphasis mine). You need a feel for the game."

There are so many parts of this exchange that are so insulting to our evolutionary ancestors that it's actually quite remarkable. Tragically, the "actually watching games" thing seems to be a common conceit among those who feel threatened by the encroachment of numbers, computers and critical thought into the once-virginal halls of The Way Things Are Done In Baseball. I just love thinking about a bunch of geeks who spend their entire lives breaking down statistics to prove that conventional baseball wisdom is silly, but adamantly refuse to watch an actual game because it's too boring, or they think it will somehow ruin their ability to view the game objectively.

You are Mike Scioscia, and I am my father's son

(Note: The majority of this post was written on Tuesday, which should explain why it sounds like it was either written on Tuesday, or that I've gone on another one of my infamous hash binges. Because you know I can't resist the sticky tarry.)

I'm not going to lie: I got roughly 1.5 hours worth of work done yesterday, which is nothing short of a miracle. Have you seen the MLB.tv Mosiac program? It might be a compelling enough setup for me to bypass Extra Innings completely, especially since I can hook up the computer to the TV at home. But at the office is where it really shines; with my two computer setup, I've got one showing games fullscreen, while I'm "working" on the other. Plus, it gave me the all-too-rare opportunity to listen to/swear at Joe Morgan during the day, which is truly the kind of experience one can't put a price tag on. Or, one can put a $120/year price tag on.

Anyway, I finished off the night with the DVRed Ranger/Angels game, and was happy to see that nothing's changed in the offseason for my favorite good manager who still consistently does stupid things, Mike Scioscia.

This was the Angels' opening-day lineup, with each player's career triple slash numbers:

1. Gary Matthews .263/.337/.419
2. Orlando Cabrera .269/.317/.403
3. Vladamir Guerrero .325/.390/.583
4. Garrett Anderson .297/.327/.470
5. Shea Hillenbrand .287/.324/.448
6. Casey Kotchman .231/.303/.355 (.325/.406/.493 in the minors)
7. Howie Kendrick .280/.310/.410 (.361/.401/.570 in the minors)
8. Mike Napoli .229/.360/.454 (can't seem to find minor league stats)
9. Macier Izturis .265/.335/.377

Two things are engrossing about this lineup:

1) No one in the top-half of the lineup, save for Guerrerro, is even modestly competent at getting on base. Matthews is coming off an allegedly HGH-fueled .313/.371/.495 year that has made his career OBP number around league average, but the rest of the hitters are simply terrible when it comes to not making outs. Most tellingly, the player who promises to do the least with his opportunities, Cabrera, is on track to get the second-most at-bats on the team this season. This is inexplicable.

2) Scioscia has one of the craziest, most segregated batting orders I've ever seen here; the entire top half is composed of (mostly bad) veterans, and the entire bottom half is promising young guys, with the possible exception of Kotchman, who's well into his post-prospect days. But he's still way fucking better than Garrett Anderson. And Howie Kendrick is probably the third-best offensive second baseman in the majors already, and he's essentially a rookie. His career minor-league average is three-sixty-fucking-one, Mike Scioscia ... you really think he can't handle the "pressure" of hitting higher in the order? And even if he couldn't, you don't think he'd be better than Cabrera anyway?

I did mean it when I said Scioscia is a good manager -- I especially love the way he handles pitching staffs, and I expect the Angels to lead the AL in every meaningful pitching category this season, and they're definitely the favorite out of the AL West -- but he is pretty fucking retarded sometimes when it comes to handling the offense. Beyond the fact that he's utterly addicted to the hit-and-run (he did it three times Monday night, without it once doing anything useful and twice ruining potentially great run-scoring situations. One strikeout/throwout DP, one FC, and one groundout with the runner advancing to 2nd. Neither commentator editorialized about the relative merit of running in those situations, but did totally go nuts when Mike Napoli's stolen base attempt resulted in a throwing error by the catcher [advancing him to third], which then turned into a run [it goes without saying that Napoli would have been out by 7-12 steps if Laird hadn't squeezed the throw]) he also does crazy things like insist on batting Darrin Erstad second (until this season, obvs) and Garrett Anderson 5th and Orlando Cabrera anywhere but ninth. In essence, when saddled with a roster of aging hitters who would rather club a pup seal on home plate than take a walk and really promising young guys who have at least shown some willingness to not flail at anything within seven inches of the plate, he gives the most at-bats to the out-makers. Yet, for some reason, I like him. He's got great intangibles.

Anyway, neither announced mentioned that it was only mildly crazy that out-machine Orlando Cabrera was batting second, but I'm not sure why. Is it because they've read the thought-provoking essay by James Click in Baseball Between the Numbers on how, statistically speaking, batting order is essentially meaningless in terms of run expectancy? Or is it because they, like Scioscia (presumably), think that the No. 2 spot in the order is the domain of slappy, fast middle infielders, regardless of whether or not the middle infielder in question is actually any good at being a major league baseball hitter? Or is it because they would never consider questioning the wisdom of a manager on-air? I suppose this is a rhetorical question, which means I can't touch it with Justin around.

What made the Cabrera situation all the more interesting is that yesterday was somewhat of a banner day for managers pulling their heads out of their asses w/r/t to the No. 2 spot in the lineup. As noted by Baseball Prospectus' Joe Sheehan, a handful of managers used "non-traditional" guys in the No. 2 hole, including Lyle Overbay, Adam Dunn, Trot Nixon and Russell Martin. What all those guys have in common is that they're high-OBP hitters with some pop. While the number isn't large enough to suggest that managers are becoming more aware of the need to get one's best hitters the most possible at-bats, as opposed to worrying most about speed and avoiding strikeouts, it's heartening.

As mentioned earlier, however, it's not exactly as if the sabermetric community is lying awake at night trying to figure out how to spread the lineup gospel. The conclusion of Click's essay in BBTN is that, the most sub-optimal batting order is probably only 18 runs worse than an optimal one over the course of the season, and that there's no statistical evidence that "protection" in a lineup is really all that important. It's a shame the two were presented in concert, because while one has merit -- "protection" is a myth, as there's no discernible difference in how batters perform based on who's hitting in front of or behind them -- the other is fundamentally flawed.

Take the decision made by Charlie Manuel to switch Utley and Howard in the lineup last night (and perhaps for a while), going Howard-Utley-Burrell in the heart of the order. He was doing it, presumably, to better "protect" Howard. Ultimately, I don't have a massive problem with Manuel's decision in a vacuum, since Howard is a better hitter than Utley (who's also awesome), and I do believe that one's best hitters should be in line to hit most often. But it's not the switch Manuel should have made; he should have swapped Burrell with either Utley or Howard, setting up a L/R/L heart of the order, which would be a huge boon to Burrell. Why? Platoon splits, friends.

Burrell vs. RH: .256/.362/.475
Burrell vs. LH: .296/.432/.526

Those are some draw-dropping spreads right there, which fits right in with Justin's Eureka! observation that he can't remember the last time Pat Burrell hit a slider away. So, if you know that you have a valuable hitter who becomes immensely more valuable when there's a southpaw on the mound, wouldn't you do whatever you could to put him in a situation where he'll actually get to hit off lefties? 3 out of 5 non-lobotomized humans agree this would be a preferable strategy; guess which camp Manuel falls into.

I realize this is getting long (and probably impossible to follow) but the point is that lineup construction is actually very important, provided you understand that everything's a matter of context. If the Phillies are facing a team that's starting a right-hander, and doesn't have any lefties in the pen, then it's probably costing the Phillies in the long-run to sandwich Burrell between Howard and Utley (or Utley and Howard ... it should be 2-3-4 with those guys anyway, but we all know that Victorino would have to hit like Mario Mendoza to lose the No. 2 hole, because he's fast). But those teams really don't exist anymore; in the age of LOOGYs and 13-man pitching staffs (The Orioles broke camp with thirteen fucking pitchers this season!), an added emphasis has been placed on removing potential gambits from the toolbox of other managers. This is particularly the case with the Phillies, who feature two young left-handed sluggers that actually fare fairly well against lefties; if Manuel sandwiched Burrell in there, the decision to bring in a LOOGY to face the heart of the order goes from mildly profitable to suicidal. Furthermore, Manuel would be setting up Burrell to actually have some eye-catching success, instead of ensuring that Burrell won't see a left-handed reliever for pretty much the rest of the season.

(Props to Sheehan, again, who touched on the Phillies' situation at BP, and started me thinking about the ramifications of Manuel's decision with his quick take on the matter)

I know what you're thinking: Diesel needs a broad, because he just wrote close to 3,000 words on batting orders. All I can say in return is that broad or no broad, it's this kind of trenchant analysis you should be demanding from me this season. Where else are you going to get this kind of shit? Not on Four Weeks with the fucking Commies, that's for goddamn sure.

There's a Steve Phillips chat taking place as I write. I am overjoyed.

Do not attempt to feed the HOFers

Check the technique, yo: Mike Schmidt is wicked pissed, and he's dropping shit like a pidgeon.

Unprompted, Mike Schmidt ticked off two names that, well, "tick me off. Pat Burrell and Adam Dunn, because they strike out so much."

First of all, I absolutely adore how incapable the Philadelphia media is of spending more than one week without broadsiding Pat Burrell. If Jim Salisbury walks into a McDonald's, and sees Burrell not tip the guy at the cash, it'll be in a story the next day. Nevermind the fact that no one tips people at McDonalds; that Burrell doesn't is more evidence that he's not a team player who strikes out too much and doesn't hustle to first and isn't even an adequate defensive left fielder and is responsible for the Great Hunger, because he was a secret British eco-terrorist in 1845.

Anyway, Schmidt has a problem with Burrell, and Dunn as well, because they strike out a lot. They are also high-OBP power hitters who are expected to slug at least .500 on a yearly basis. But I understand, to a point; Schmidt was one of those extremely rare power hitters who also managed to strike out infrequently. We can't expect him to understand the toils of lesser mortals ... oh, yes, we totally can:

This came from a guy who struck out 1,883 times during 18 years with the Phillies, including five seasons of more than 135 whiffs. He struck out so much early in his career that teammate Willie Montañez called him "Ah-choo" because strikeouts create the same breeze as a sneeze.

A guy who struck out so much that a nickname of his referred to his inability to avoid taking the collar is really pissed off that Burrell and Dunn strike out so much. It should be noted that the nicknames of those players are "Pat the Bat" and "Big Donkey," respectively. I do not believe either of those nicknames have to do with striking out, so obviously they have baseball talents that far outweigh their weaknesses, real or imagined.

Schmidt, the keynote speaker yesterday morning at a breakfast in Dayton, Ohio, said he regretted the way he approached hitting during his Hall of Fame career.

"Now I know that if I had choked up on the bat with two strikes and hadn't been so aggressive and gave in to the pitcher, I wouldn't have struck out so much. And that's what guys like Dunn and Burrell have to realize," Schmidt added.

Poor Mike Schmidt. I'm sure what he's thinking, when he's named to another publication's All-Century Team and is called pretty much unarguably the greatest third baseman of all-time by people who study baseball for a living, he thinks to himself, "They shoulda picked Carney Lansford!" You know why? Because Carney Lansford choked up on the fucking bat when there were two strikes, dammit.

Mike Schmidt career OPS+: 147
Mike Schmidt career SsTP (Sumbissions to Pitcher): 1883

Carney Lansford career OPS+: 111
Carney Lansford career SsTP: 719

Yep, Schmidt really should have spent less time being one of the singular offensive forces in the game and more time worrying about "not giving into the pitcher," which apparently means assuring the pitcher that you're content tapping out to the shortstop in an effort to avoid the ignominy of striking out.

Schmidt said that with a game on the line, pitchers don't mind facing guys like the Reds' Dunn and the Phillies' Burrell because they know they can strike them out.

"How do I know this? Because when I played, pitchers wanted me up there with the game on the line," he said. "They'd rather face me than a guy behind me like Greg Luzinski, who would put the ball in play.

I want to meet the pitcher who doesn't mind facing Burrell or Dunn in tight situations. I will not meet this pitcher, because he is such an idiot that he drowned yesterday in his bathroom sink while shaving.

As for the whole "they'd rather face me than Luzinski because he'd put the ball in play," thing, I think Schmidt has been dipping into my hash supply.

Mike Schmidt, SsTP/162 games: 127
Greg Luzinski, SsTP/162 games: 133

Anyway, not content to simply be wrong with his anecdotes, Schmidt decides to also be wrong with statistics. This is a wonderful quote:

"I look at Dunn and Burrell and I go, 'My God, if these guys cut their strikeouts down to 75 or 80, they put the ball in play 85 or 90 more times a year.' That's at least 15 more home runs a year and at least 35 more RBIs a year."

Mike Schmidt has already told us the way a batter can, theoretically, cut down on his strikeouts is to choke up on the bat, shortening his swing. When one shortens his swing, it cuts down (often drastically) on his power. Or so one would think; Mike Schmidt has actually found the door to the Matrix, here, because he's theorizing that shortening one's swing will actually cause one to hit home runs more frequently.

Burrell, HR/balls in play, 2006: 11.4
Burrell, HR/balls in play, in Schmidt's fantasy world of shortened swings: 6

That's fucking genius.

Schmidt hit 548 home runs, was National League MVP four times, and was named the top major-league player of the 1980s, despite his strikeouts. He wonders whether Dunn and Burrell watch St. Louis superstar Albert Pujols, a guy who hits not only for power but also for average, and strikes out fewer than 70 times a year.

"I mean, why would Dunn and Burrell watch what Pujols does and not want to be like him, as good as he is?" Schmidt said. "When their careers are over, they are going to wonder how much they left on the table, how much they left on the field. If only they had choked up with two strikes, spread their stances out. What they are doing now is not great, it is mediocrity."

We're going to ignore the fact that trying to compare Pat Burrell to once-in-a-generation hitters like PooHoles and Joe DiMaggio (guys who hit for power despite not striking out a ton) seems to be a favorite theme of Philadelphia sportswriters. What we are not going to ignore is the sheer lunacy Schmidt is displaying here: He actually thinks that the only thing separating PooHoles and Burrell is the latter's stubbornness in re: Striking Out. If only Burrell would strike out less, he'd suddenly turn into one of the single most incredible offensive players in the history of the sport.

Justin, my good friend, can you please explain to me why it is that retired Phillies greats are turning into total fucking retards?

Also, just because stuff like this is interesting to me, did anyone notice this?

Burrell in 2005: .289/.389/.504
Burrell in 2006: .258/.388/.502

Burrell, at one point, was benched because he was having such a "horrible" season (that is not a quote from anyone in particular), but did anyone on the coaching staff notice that, with the exception of batting average, he was having a virtually identical (and excellent) offensive season this year as he did last year? If anything, Burrell's '06 is more impressive, because he had to fade a 31-point drop in BA in order to keep his OBP and SLG in order. That's unreal! By all means, Kevin Towers, if Pat Gillick is dumb enough to pay any portion of this gentleman's salary, I would be more than happy to remove this albatross from the Philadelphia lineup.

Also:

Take a gander at 2006 most egregious SsTP offenders in the NL:

NL

Dunn-CIN	194
Howard-PHI	181
Hall-MIL	162
Soriano-WSN	160
Bay-PIT	156

I mean, fuck those guys. Always giving in to the pitcher and shit. When they're not too busy being five of the most valuable hitters in all of baseball.

Goddammitimdoingitagain

Apparently, there was nothing to say about the Yankees today.

The Phillies are built upon old-fashioned scout values, which figures, because general manager Pat Gillick is still an old-fashioned scout, prone to traveling thousands of miles on late notice to see a low-level minor league player or an amateur prospect with his own eyes. He often makes these trips clandestinely, sometimes without telling even some of his colleagues, because he does not want his whereabouts revealed.

Sportswriters love this kind of stuff. See, it’s not exciting if you say, “Gillick spends many hours in front of his computer and talking to his well-paid staff of scouts and consultants, in an effort to decide which players he’ll acquire. Gillick says it’s a good thing he has a comfortable office chair, because he never leaves the fucking thing. And he’s got the sores to prove it.” It is exciting, however, when you romanticize and mythologize the process of scouting and selecting players. People think there’s something to it, that maybe Gillick has a special, bionic eye that will take an x-ray of the 17-year-old pitcher on the bump and measure heart, or gumption, or extrapolate future injuries. But none of that’s true. All Gillick will do is sit in the stands with a radar gun, just like every other scout, and try and figure out a new phrase for “throws hard/shitty curve ball.” And then, he’ll go to a bar, get drunk with all the other scouts, swap new phrases for mundane baseball abilities, and try and commit an act of infidelity with some townie skank.

Here’s my real question, though: If you’re the owner of the Phillies, and you’re paying Gillick millions of dollars, do you really want him clandestinely traveling to rookie ball games in Tacoma? Isn’t this a total waste of time? You’re the fucking G.M. of a major league franchise, one that employs a small army of scouts. You don’t expect the CEO of Home Depot to go slag 2x4s, because it would be inappropriate, and the job of a high-level administrator is to supervise and delegate, not do the fucking work himself. This anecdote alone makes me think that Gillick is in the running for the annual Steve Phillips Memorial Shittiest GM in Sports Award, presented by Rubio’s.

The modern-day trend is for teams to shift more resources into the structure of the bullpen. The Mets, for example, have three excellent left-handed relievers in Billy Wagner, Scott Schoeneweis and Pedro Feliciano, and solid right-handers Duaner Sanchez, Aaron Heilman and Guillermo Mota, with Ambiorix Burgos coming in as a high-ceiling candidate from Kansas City. And the Mets have made a calculated gamble that they can piece together enough starting pitching to consistently get a close game into the hands of that bullpen.

The Phillies, on the other hand, have stacked their rotation, the way teams have been trying to win for, oh, about a century. They have All-Star Brett Myers, star talent Cole Hamels, veterans Freddy Garcia and Jamie Moyer, and free-agent signee Adam Eaton. They've got Jon Lieber for depth, as well, although it is still possible that Lieber will be traded for offensive help.

On it’s face, I don’t have a problem with what Buster’s written here, except he’s missing a crucial piece of information that provides context to what the Mets are doing versus what the Phillies are doing, and it has to do with resource allocation he glancingly mentions. The starting pitching market is total batshit right now, as proven by the fact that virtual corpse Gil Meche will be making $11 per season. The Mets, who have spent an assload to put together the NL’s most complete and powerful lineup, wisely decided it was better to take $10 million and get three good-to-great bullpen arms than it was to get one mediocre starter. Well, at least I think it’s wise. Others disagree, which is cool. But the point is, it’s not just that the Mets think stacking the bullpen is a better strategy, regardless of the financial concerns. But Buster makes it sound that way, which I have a small problem with.

What I have a big problem with is the absolutely retarded “old-school vs. new school,” shit, because it’s stupid. To think that something done in the 20s is automatically applicable in today’s game is asinine, and intellectually lazy. I realize the Buster’s opening blog entry is supposed to be pithy, but why even bring this shit up if you’re not actually going to explore it? In the two following paragraphs, he mentions something about the number of outs each team expects from the respective units, which is pointless and doesn’t really add anything to the argument. So, all Buster’s done is add a stamp of credibility to what Gillick’s done, because maybe Connie Mack used to feel the same way, back when mounds were five feet off the ground and there used to be memorials in the center fields of certain stadiums.

He also fails to mention, anywhere, that Jamie Moyer once soft-tossed with the Peking Man and that Adam Eaton sucks ass.

And while most teams are relying on on-base percentage, the Phillies have traded some of the crown princes of on-base percentage (Jim Thome and Bobby Abreu), while making a concerted effort to create a lineup of players who score high in intangibles among scouts, like Shane Victorino, Aaron Rowand, Chase Utley, and, of course, NL MVP Ryan Howard. High energy, high intensity, major effort guys in their daily preparation. Wes Helms, who will share time at third base this year, is never going to be confused with Miguel Cabrera in his production, but he is a well-respected professional and of the players with at least 150 plate appearances, he led all major league hitters in average after the All-Star break last season, hitting .385.

I … just … can’t … take … it … anymore. I really thought you were better than this, Buster. You read more on a daily basis than maybe any sportswriter in America. I assumed that, along the way, you would have read enough convincing arguments (like those made by your colleague Rob Neyer) that you would at least quit with the OBP baiting. There isn’t a single, respected baseball mind that really doubts that OBP is the most central statistic to a hitter’s efficacy, the one that you choose if you’re forced to only choose one (if we’re ignoring the more esoteric sabermetric stats, which the readers of this blog are wont to do). The one stat that tells you why both Mark McGwire and Tony Gwynn were awesome and extremely valuable to their teams, even if they looked totally different and had different ancillary stats and hit in different spots in the lineup.
You know why scouts love “intangibles,” folks? Because, since they don’t exist, a scout can then never be wrong. They also have nothing to do with actual quality of play; to say someone “hustles” gives little insight into exactly what one can expect from the player once they’re on the field, outside of knowing that he’s going to bust his ass running out grounders.

But here’s the best part: You mean to tell me Utley and Howard score high in “intangibles?” No shit? Who gives a flying fuck?!?!? Ryan Howard is probably the most-feared hitter in the NL (or second behind Pooholes) and Utley is so far and away the best second baseman in the league, it’s actually kind of silly (especially when you consider that two seasons ago, he was stuck in a R-L platoon). Utley’s intangibles are absolutely, completely irrelevant to any discussion of his value as a baseball player.

As for Victorino, Rowand and Helms? I hope their intangibles involve explaining to Utley and Howard why no one’s ever on base when they’re up to bat. But, more than likely, they’ll be too busy to talk, what with all the goddamn wind sprints they’ll be running in the tunnel.

Gillick sounded optimistic on the phone Tuesday night, liking the makeup of his team, raving about Hamels and what he could do. Once a week in spring training, Gillick said, Moyer -- who has won 216 games in his career because of his understanding of how to change speeds -- will meet with other pitchers on the Phillies' staff to talk about pitching. "If you have a guy like that around, you might as well take advantage of it," Gillick said.

I agree, Moyer was an excellent choice as pitching coach. Hold on … oh, you’re paying him millions of dollars to be an effective starter? Oh. That kind of changes things.